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Home / Magazine / Archives 06-07 / January/February 2006 / A Push for Majority Rule Roils the Boardroom

A Push for Majority Rule Roils the Boardroom

from January/February 2006
by Julie Connelly
Unless you’ve been living in the trees all year, you are probably aware that a number of shareholder proposals popped up this past proxy season requesting that corporate directors be elected by majority vote instead of the customary plurality. If the would-be reformers have their way, a board candidate who doesn’t get more than 50% of the vote cannot be elected—or reelected—even if nobody else is after the job.

Three directors fell into that category in 2005, all at Career Education Corp., a company that owns Katharine Gibbs schools and other teaching establishments. More than 30 others came relatively close (see the print version for examples). In some cases, shareholders were objecting to boards as a whole—upset over a poison-pill provision, perhaps—and singled out the board members who were up for reelection. Other times, the withhold votes were personal: Shareholders just didn’t like a particular director.

Either way, the push to make a withhold vote more meaningful is gathering momentum. According to Institutional Shareholder Services, which advises major investors on how to vote, the 60 proposals for majority voting among the Standard & Poor’s 500 that were filed through the end of June were the largest number on any subject. (Board declassification, or ending staggered elections, a proxy perennial, came in second with 42 proposals.) At 16 of the companies, including high-tech outfits such as Advanced Micro Devices and Altera Corp., the proposals for majority voting actually passed. Overall, their support from shareholders averaged 45%, versus 12% for the dozen proposals submitted the previous year, when none passed. As Patrick McGurn, executive president of ISS, notes, the push for majority voting “has grown exponentially.”

The plurality vote is a holdover from the 20th century, when many corporations were owned by rival factions battling for control of the board. Since no candidate was likely to win a clear majority of over 50% of the votes cast, there was a risk that board seats would not be filled. So Delaware law, which covers more than half of public companies, opted for a plurality vote instead, awarding victory to whoever got the highest number of votes. Other states followed suit. Battles for votes still happen in contested elections, but they’re rare these days. More commonly, only one candidate runs for a board seat and voters who don’t like him or her or who object to board actions as a whole simply withhold their votes. In the case of institutional shareholders, they also often recommend that others follow suit. But this arrangement seems to be changing. Among recent developments:

Clearly activists want that withhold vote to mean a lot more. While Pfizer and others have bought into this principle by altering their governance guidelines, they have included a big escape clause that irks reformers: Their boards do not have to accept the resignations of directors who get a majority of withhold votes. To Margaret Foran, the drug company’s senior vice president for corporate governance and associate general counsel (and co-chair of the ABA task force), this gives everybody breathing room. “We all need flexibility as we try to figure out what works best,” she says. “If there is a problem with a specific type of director, then ours is a very simple solution. It gives us time to talk to the institutions and find out what’s going on.”

The chief proponents of majority voting have been the union pension funds, notably the United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America. They’ve been supported by big public pension funds like the California Public Employees’ Retirement System, along with ISS and fellow watchdogs Glass Lewis & Co. and the Council of Institutional Investors. Says Richard Ferlauto, director of investment policy at the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, which has also filed proposals for majority voting: “There seems to be a fairly broad consensus, at least among shareholders, that votes need to count for something.”

The demands for change began to gather steam two years ago with the Securities and Exchange Commission’s push to improve shareholder access to the ballot. The agency wanted big shareholders to have the right to include their nominees for a board in the company’s proxy materials (provided they met certain somewhat complex conditions), rather than being forced to mount an independent campaign. The idea suffocated under ferocious business-community opposition and the departure of its chief proponent, SEC chairman William Donaldson. So having lost out on the possibility of nominating their own directors, the activists began to think about the flip side: getting rid of directors they didn’t like.

With one exception, all the 2005 proposals calling for majority voting were “precatory”—that is, they asked that boards adopt majority voting—instead of binding, which would force the companies to change their bylaws. Explains Richard Ferlauto: “The purpose of precatory resolutions is to alert boards that if they don’t move on these, binding ones will follow.”

The 2005 exception came about in October, when Ferlauto’s union submitted a binding proposal at Paychex Inc.’s annual meeting. The motion was defeated 80% to 19% (1% abstained). But it did find qualified support in a surprising quarter—John Morphy, Paychex’s CFO. “I think majority voting is probably the right answer,” he said before the vote. But Morphy wants to wait until there is an established best practice and then adopt that. “We think it’s better to go to majority voting because it has become a best practice, and not because someone forced you to,” he says.

Loss of their board seats may also mean that directors lose control of the nomination process for new board members. But don’t turn to Ferlauto for sympathy. “You have to add directors to the board who can shake up a company that needs it,” he says. “You need to avoid ending up with a cycle where, as [former SEC commissioner] Harvey Goldschmidt puts it, one bozo replaces another.”

Some directors fear that majority voting will enable special interests to hijack the corporate agenda. In “The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights,” a paper he wrote in 2004, UCLA law professor Stephen Bainbridge said, “Institutional investors with substantial decision-making influence will be tempted to use their position to self-deal; i.e. to take a non-pro-rata share of the firm’s assets and earnings.” He added a footnote about how unions use their share ownership in a company to obtain worker benefits they can’t get from collective bargaining.

Robert McCormick, vice president of proxy research and operations at Glass Lewis & Co., the activist group, believes this line of thinking patronizes stockholders. “Yes,” he says, “there may be some who are trying to put forth their own agendas, but all investors are looking to maximize their returns.”

And what happens if majority voting leaves a company way down on its board head count, or even with no board at all? The likelihood of the latter, of course, is—or should be—remote. If the board presents a director slate that objectionable to shareholders, the company should know it, and know why, long before the vote is tallied. Says Dan Dalton, director of the Institute for Corporate Governance at Indiana University: “Public companies have enormous exposure to institutional investors. If they manage to vote four directors, say, off the board, it isn’t just disgruntled shareholders—it’s the entire investment community speaking. Were that to happen, almost certainly there has been a failed negotiation between the company and the shareholders.”

The loss of an individual director or two is a possibility, and even the CEO could find himself a boardroom outcast. At the 2005 annual meeting of publisher McGraw-Hill Cos., Harold W. McGraw III, the chairman and CEO, received a 32% withhold vote. Activists were miffed that the company had ignored a 2004 shareholder proposal to repeal its poison pill.

Filling seats left empty as a result of majority voting can be done in various ways. Boards themselves can elect replacements, who then stand for election at the next annual meeting. Attorney Ira Milstein, the governance expert at Weil Gotshal & Manges, likes the Pfizer approach—namely that a company should be required to convene the shareholders and elect replacements within 120 days. The Council of Institutional Investors wants replacements elected by the shareholders within 90 days.

Until those seats are filled, a company may well be in the awkward situation of having a board that is at odds with the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley. “Most of the committees are three-person committees,” says Dan Dalton, “and if you lose one person, you’re out of compliance.”

Activists are already gearing up for the 2006 proxy season. The Carpenters & Joiners union has filed a nonbinding proposal to elect the directors of uniform manufacturer Cintas Corp. by majority vote. The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees has submitted a similar proposal at the Morgan Stanley investment bank.

Even the Business Roundtable, no fan of majority voting, expects companies to continue changing their governance guidelines voluntarily. Says Dalton: “Taking the high ground when the cost is modest is a good risk for these companies. They don’t want the plumbers and steamfitters showing up at their doors.” That could throw a wrench into their business.